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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Emotions are a fundamental part of the human experience that shape how we view, 
interpret, and react to our world. Humans regulate their emotions in order to change their internal 
emotional state as well as to manage their emotional expression in social situations. Emotion 
regulation refers to a set of processes by which a person can modulate the intensity of the 
emotion they are experiencing. Emotions can be regulated before an emotional response 
(antecedent-focused emotion regulation, which includes such strategies as situation selection, 
situation modification, attentional deployment, and cognitive change) or after an emotional 
response has been generated (response-focused emotion regulation, such as response modulation; 
Gross & Muñoz, 1995). For example, Gross (1998) found that those who used reappraisal, a 
form of cognitive change, during a negative film clip had decreased behavioral and subjective 
signs of emotions and no elevations during physiological responding; however, those who used 
suppression, a form of response modulation, had increases in physiological arousal and no 
change in subjective emotion experience, despite suppressed emotional behavior. Reviews of the 
literature have suggested that reappraisal is more effective at changing emotional experience than 
suppression (Gross, 2001, 2002). Although more research is needed examining other antecedent- 
and response-focused emotion regulation aside from reappraisal and suppression, one study of 
multiple emotion-regulation strategies found that increased use of antecedent-focused strategies 
is associated with enhanced well-being (Schutte, Manes, & Malouff, 2009).  
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Many forms of emotion regulation are intentional, effortful processes, such as distraction, 
in which a person attends to less negative aspects of their environment to decrease a negative 
emotion, and reappraisal, in which a person changes the meaning of a given situation in order to 
change their emotional response (Gross, 2002). However, not all emotion regulation strategies 
are purposely used to change emotional experience. Affect labeling1, the act of “putting feelings 
into words” (Lieberman et al., 2007), is considered an incidental emotion-regulation process; 
most people do not intentionally label their emotions as a form of emotion regulation 
(Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011). Multiple functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) studies have demonstrated that affect labeling in response to emotional images 
and faces involves increased activation of the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC) and 
decreased activation of the amygdala, mediated by activity in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(MPFC; Burklund, Creswell, Irwin, & Lieberman, 2014; Hariri, Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 
2000; Lieberman et al., 2007). Psychologically, this suggests that individuals who are labeling 
their emotions are processing their feelings linguistically, which actively changes them. Thus, a 
potential neurological mechanism for the effectiveness of affect labeling at down-regulating 
emotions has been indicated. 
Emotion-regulation skills, such as reappraisal, are a key component of cognitive-
behavioral therapy (Berking et al., 2008; Moscovitch et al., 2012). However, it has been 
																																																						
1 Throughout this manuscript, I use the term affect labeling to refer to the process of naming 
one’s emotions, as it has been used in the fields of social neuroscience and psychotherapy 
research. Some emotion scholars may object to this term due to the differences in emotion, a 
specific set of feelings, behaviors, and appraisals that are typically of short duration and directed 
at a specific object, and affect, a broader feeling state consisting of the components of valence 
(pleasure/displeasure) and activation (Russell & Barrett, 1999). Emotion labeling may be a more 
accurate term, but I primarily use affect labeling for the sake of consistency in the literature. I 
thank Jo-Anne Bachorowski for her feedback on this important point. 
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suggested that reappraisal is more difficult under significant cognitive load (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2012; Ortner, 2015), and thus may be difficult for some patients to utilize in stressful situations. 
Affect labeling, while not effort-free, involves mere identification of the emotion one is feeling 
in the moment, which may be a simpler cognitive process for some individuals. One study that 
directly compared the two processes found slower reaction times in those who were told to 
reappraise their emotions in contrast to those who were instructed to label them; participants in 
both groups did not differ on a measure of physiological arousal (skin conductance), meaning 
that both reappraisal and affect labeling equally down-regulate emotions on a physiological level 
(Ortner, 2015). A neuroimaging study comparing reappraisal and affect labeling found common 
neural substrates for both of these emotion-regulation strategies: decreased amygdala activation 
and increased prefrontal cortex activation, specifically in the inferior frontal gyrus (Payer, Baicy, 
Lieberman, & London, 2012). If affect labeling is equivalently effective at down-regulating 
emotions compared to reappraisal but can be done more efficiently under cognitive load, it may 
be a useful skill to learn, especially for individuals who struggle to regulate their emotions 
through the methods commonly taught in cognitive-behavioral therapy. 
Affect labeling can be used in other psychological interventions as well, but the specific 
mechanism for its effectiveness is as yet unclear. Two studies examined the effect of affect 
labeling on symptom reporting in undergraduates and in irritable-bowel-syndrome (IBS) 
patients. Among undergraduate students, those who labeled images either emotionally or non-
emotionally had reduced symptom reporting when viewing unpleasant images (Constantinou, 
van den Houte, Bogaerts, van Diest, & van den Bergh, 2014). A trend toward reduced symptom 
reporting was found but did not reach significance in the IBS patient group (Constantinou et al., 
2015). Neither of these studies found a specific benefit of affect labeling over content labeling, 
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suggesting that the mechanism of action may be through increased attention or cognitive 
processing of an image compared to passive viewing. However, a previous fMRI study found 
that affect labeling of emotional faces led to decreased amygdala activation and increased 
RVLPFC activation compared to gender labeling (Lieberman et al., 2007). Another study found 
that objective, but not subjective, labeling of emotional valence (positivity/negativity) reduced 
physiological arousal in healthy men (McRae, Taitano, & Lane, 2010). These mixed findings 
merit additional research to determine if affect labeling has a specific emotion-regulation effect 
above and beyond the act of labeling alone. 
Affect labeling may also overlap with acceptance, a mindfulness-based strategy to 
regulate one’s emotions. Acceptance encourages individuals to emotionally disengage rather 
than attempt to change their emotions. In mindfulness-based interventions, individuals are 
encouraged to acknowledge the presence of an emotion, label it, and move on, without judging 
the emotional experience (Hayes & Feldman, 2004; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Studies 
have indicated that trait mindfulness is associated with greater activation in the prefrontal cortex 
and reduced bilateral amygdala activity during affect labeling. Individuals high in trait 
mindfulness had a negative correlation between activation in the right ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex and activation in the right amygdala during an affect-labeling task, but this correlation 
was not significant in those low in trait mindfulness (Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 
2007). Thus, individual differences in emotion-regulation ability and trait mindfulness may 
moderate the effectiveness of affect labeling such that individuals high in trait mindfulness might 
see increased benefit from affect labeling compared to less mindful individuals. Alternatively, 
because affect labeling is a relatively simple and easily learned process, it is possible that 
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individuals with weaker emotion-regulation skills may see a greater benefit after being 
introduced to this new skill. 
In addition to its uses in mindfulness- and acceptance-based therapeutic approaches, 
affect labeling may also be applied to behavior therapy. According to the inhibitory learning 
model of extinction, affect labeling may enhance prefrontal cortex engagement and therefore 
maximize inhibitory control. Improved inhibitory control over the amygdala may improve 
inhibitory learning and reduce return of fear, suggesting that affect labeling could be used to 
improve exposure therapy outcomes (Craske et al., 2008; Craske, Treanor, Conway, Zbozinek, & 
Vervliet, 2014). Three studies have examined affect labeling in exposure. Tabibnia, Lieberman, 
and Craske (2008) found that labeling negatively valenced images using unrelated words results 
in reduced physiological arousal to both previously exposed images and novel images after two 
sessions of exposure. They hypothesized that using unrelated labels led to deeper processing of 
the images; however, the use of unrelated labels does not fit the definition of affect labeling of 
“putting one’s feelings into words.” Alternatively, unrelated emotional labeling may simply be a 
form of distraction. A follow-up study with spider-phobic patients comparing affect labeling to 
reappraisal and distraction in exposure found that participants in the affect labeling condition had 
the greatest decreases in physiological arousal, but no significant differences were observed in 
self-reported fear and approach behavior (Kircanski, Lieberman, & Craske, 2012). Finally, a 
third study found that affect labeling during exposure led to reduced physiological arousal during 
a public speaking task compared to an exposure-only control group, with a greater effect of 
affect labeling for those with greater deficits in incidental emotion-regulation skills (Niles, 
Craske, Lieberman, & Hur, 2015). Thus, explicitly encouraging affect labeling during exposure 
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may provide greater benefits to individuals who have trouble automatically identifying their 
emotions in fearful contexts. 
While there is initial support for the effectiveness of affect labeling during exposure, only 
one study used multiple methods of analysis to measure the down-regulation of emotion, and this 
study found no effect on a self-report measure of fear (Kircanski et al., 2012). In addition, all 
three studies focused on either undifferentiated negative or fear-provoking stimuli, without 
examining the effect of affect labeling on multiple emotions. While fear extinction is the 
presumed basis of exposure therapy, fear is not the only emotion that is dysregulated in anxiety 
and related disorders. For example, research suggests that disgust is a prominent emotion in 
anxiety disorders and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), psychological disorders for which 
exposure therapy is very effective (Olatunji, Cisler, McKay, & Phillips, 2010). Disgust 
propensity changes during the course of exposure therapy, suggesting it may also be a potential 
target for affect labeling during exposure (de Jong, Andrea, & Muris, 1997; Hirai et al., 2008; 
McKay, 2006; Smits, Telch, & Randall, 2002; Taboas, Ojserkis, & McKay, 2014). The 
dysregulation of other emotions is a feature of different types of psychopathology, as well. 
Excessive and enduring sadness is implicated in complicated grief, dysphoria, and depression, 
although depression is more than the constant experience of sadness and also involves a lack of 
pleasure (anhedonia; Bonanno, Goorin, & Coifman, 2008). Because depression is often 
maintained through rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008), affect labeling may not prove to be useful in depressed individuals, as 
labeling sad experiences may serve to maintain feelings of sadness. An empirical test of this 
hypothesis is warranted. 
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Despite this conceptual understanding of emotions as distinct and separable, emotion 
theorists debate the existence of discrete, basic emotion categories, especially at the neural level. 
The existence of discrete neural pathways for different emotions versus the existence of common 
neural mechanisms underlying all emotions is debated. For instance, the amygdala is 
prominently implicated in fear conditioning, but research has also shown that the amygdala 
responds to novelty and emotional salience rather than fear alone (Anderson & Phelps, 2001). 
Broader emotional activity in the brain also cannot be functionally reduced to a single system, as 
demonstrated by inconsistency in definitions of the limbic system and the role of cortical areas in 
emotion generation and regulation (Ledoux & Phelps, 2008). Additionally, a review of the 
neuroimaging literature on emotion found that although there was some consistency in brain 
regions associated with fear and sadness, correspondence between studies was modest and 
lacked specificity (Barrett & Wager, 2006; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Alternative 
theories of emotions include understanding emotion as consisting of separate dimensions of 
valence and arousal (Russell & Barrett, 1999), or as the product of the experience of core affect 
and conceptual knowledge of emotion (conceptual act theory; Barrett, 2006a, 2006b; Barrett & 
Wager, 2006; Gross & Barrett, 2011). Few neuroimaging studies have examined emotions from 
a dimensional approach, and their variable methods make it difficult to draw firm conclusions 
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). A recent 
model, similar to the conceptual act model but specifically referencing neural substrates of 
emotional valence, is called the affective workspace hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, 
valence is produced through the interaction of multiple systems in the brain, including the 
salience network, default mode network, and frontoparietal control network (Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009; Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012). A meta-analysis of 
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397 neuroimaging studies found support for the affective workspace hypothesis (Lindquist, 
Satpute, Wager, Weber, & Barrett, 2016). 
One study directly compared the theory of basic emotions, in which distinct emotions 
each have a separate network in the brain, with the conceptual act theory of emotion 
(Touroutoglou, Lindquist, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2014). This study found evidence for the 
conceptual act model, as variance in the analyzed networks was accounted for by a domain-
general network, and the salience network was activated for each analyzed network. However, 
data in this study were collected using resting-state functional connectivity MRI, rather than 
scanning the brains of participants who were actively engaged in an emotion task. Conversely, a 
recent study using multivariate pattern analysis across multiple emotion-induction methods 
found that different emotions have discrete neural signatures (Saarimaki et al., 2015), avoiding 
the a priori bias of region of interest analyses. This study also specifically used a labeling task, 
in which participants were given a list of words before scanning and asked to think of or write 
down a method to elicit this emotion by thinking of a past event, related scene in a movie, or 
recreating one’s bodily state during that emotion. During scanning, participants used imagery for 
each emotion word viewed to elicit that emotion. Although the issue of how emotions are 
represented in the brain is far from settled, there is some evidence of specific neural patterns for 
basic emotions. 
As previously mentioned, much of the research on affect labeling suggests a specific 
neural mechanism for the down-regulation of emotional experience: increased activation of 
RVLPFC and MPFC, and decreased amygdala activation (Lieberman et al., 2007). However, this 
research has been conducted primarily with emotional facial expressions (Hariri et al., 2000; 
Lieberman et al., 2007) and negatively valenced stimuli for which differential effects across 
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emotion categories were not examined (Burklund et al., 2014). If different emotions have distinct 
neural pathways, the pattern of activation during affect labeling may change during the 
experience of different negative emotions. However, if the primary effect of down-regulating the 
amygdala is to decrease response to emotional salience, we might expect affect labeling to 
similarly dampen affect across equivalently salient emotional contexts. Thus, an examination of 
affect labeling across multiple emotional contexts, controlling for variance in emotional valence, 
may provide stronger evidence for the existence of basic emotions or emotions as dimensional 
entities arising from an affective workspace in the brain. 
Although preliminary research on affect labeling is promising, the mechanism that may 
account for the effectiveness of affect labeling on undifferentiated negative or fear-provoking 
images is unclear, in part because prior research has failed to employ multiple units of analysis 
as a dependent measure of affect labeling. Using multiple dependent variables will provide a 
more precise examination of when and how affect labeling affects emotion, whether through 
emotional valence, physiological arousal, or a combination of these processes. If the effects of 
affect labeling are only evident in measures of arousal, it may be that affect labeling primarily 
affects the arousal dimension of emotion, rather than emotional valence. A significant difference 
in self-reported emotional intensity across multiple emotions may suggest differences in 
conscious processing and understanding of emotion after affect labeling. 
In the current study, images from three discrete emotional categories (fear, disgust, and 
sadness) were presented to participants using an image viewing paradigm from a previous 
experiment (Tabibnia et al., 2008, Study 2). Although images could have been selected from a 
number of other negative emotion categories, including anger, shame, and embarrassment, the 
three emotional categories selected for this study are highly relevant to mood and anxiety 
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disorders and have reliably been induced through image presentation in previous laboratory 
studies (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). Additionally, fear and disgust are often 
targeted in exposure therapy for anxiety disorders and OCD, warranting a direct comparison 
between them in an affect-labeling exposure paradigm. Sadness was chosen for comparison, as a 
similarly negative emotion that is typically addressed differently in therapeutic contexts. Images 
from these three categories were presented to participants in three different conditions, which 
varied by the context in which images were presented (unlabeled, labeled with a related negative 
emotion word, and labeled with an unrelated negative emotion word). These labeling contexts 
were selected in order to clarify the mixed findings on the effectiveness of unrelated and related 
labels in down-regulating emotions (Tabibnia et al., 2008). Theoretically, for these labeling 
effects to be specifically attributable to affect labeling, the words following the images must 
describe the emotion that the participant feels. Unrelated emotion words or content labels would 
not be expected to demonstrate the same effects. 
During the display of each emotional image, peak skin conductance amplitude was 
measured. Skin conductance is a reliable measure of physiological arousal and is differentially 
associated with different emotions (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Lang et al., 1993). In 
addition to measuring skin conductance, participants rated the intensity of the emotion and 
overall distress caused by each image after it was presented, and mean emotional intensity and 
distress scores were computed for each emotion category and compared across labeling 
conditions. This study therefore provides both objective measures of arousal and subjective 
measures of overall distress and specific emotional experience. 
A follow-up procedure was conducted to provide information about the stability of the 
effect of affect labeling over time, as well as generalization to novel images. This aspect of the 
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experimental design allows for examination into affect labeling’s specific effects, which have 
implications for its use as a learned emotion-regulation strategy. The effect of affect labeling 
may be temporary or enduring. It may affect emotion regulation specifically or broadly. Two 
alternative hypotheses are explored: if affect labeling down-regulates emotional experience, 
emotional intensity and peak skin conductance will be lowest for images in the negative label 
contexts across all three conditions. If affect labeling has differential effects across negative 
emotions, previous research suggests that larger reductions in emotional intensity and peak skin 
conductance may be seen in fear and disgust labeling compared to sadness labeling.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
 One hundred twenty participants were enrolled in this study. Participants included 
Vanderbilt undergraduates recruited from the SONA Psychological Sciences Research Pool as 
well as Vanderbilt community members recruited from flyers placed on campus. Undergraduates 
received class credit for participating in the study, while community members received $10 for 
completing each experimental session ($20 total). Two participants withdrew from the study 
after the first session, leaving complete data for 118 participants. Mean age was 27.8 years, with 
a range from 18 to 85. Most participants were Caucasian (63.6%) and female (66.9%). There 
were no differences on any demographic variables between labeling conditions. 
2.2 Measures 
 The Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004) is a 9-item self-
report measure of experiential avoidance, an unwillingness to experience negative emotions. 
Respondents rate how well items apply to them on a Likert scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true). Higher scores on the AAQ are correlated with greater psychopathology and lower quality 
of life. 
 The Assessing Emotions Scale (AES; Schutte et al., 1998; Schutte, Malouff, & Bhullar, 
2009) is a 33-item self-report scale measuring emotional intelligence. It includes assessment of 
the ability to recognize emotion in oneself and others, emotional expression, emotion regulation, 
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and how a person utilizes emotion to solve problems. Respondents rate how much each item 
reflects how they handle their emotions on a Likert scale from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 
“strongly agree.” The AES has good internal consistency and good external validity. 
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) is a 21-item self-report measure 
of anxiety symptoms. Respondents rate how much specific anxiety symptoms have bothered 
them during the past week from 0 (not at all) to 3 (severely; I could barely stand it). The BAI is 
widely used and has high internal consistency. 
 The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) is a 
20-item self-report measure of depressive symptoms. Respondents rate items based on how often 
they felt a certain way during the past week, from “rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)” 
to “all of the time (5-7 days)”; scores range from 0 to 60. The CES-D has high internal 
consistency in both the general population and in patient samples. 
 The Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised (DPSS-R; Olatunji, Cisler, 
Deacon, Connolly, & Lohr, 2007; van Overveld, de Jong, Peters, Cavanagh, & Davey, 2006) is a 
16-item self-report measure of individuals’ reactions to disgust. The DPSS-R is made up of two 
subscales: The Disgust Propensity scale measures how frequently individuals experience disgust, 
and the Disgust Sensitivity scale measures the emotional impact of experiencing disgust. 
Respondents answer how often each item is true for them on a Likert scale from 1 (Never) to 5 
(Always). In this study, only the Disgust Sensitivity subscale is used, due to the demonstrated 
relationship between disgust sensitivity and psychopathology (Olatunji et al., 2010; Olatunji & 
Sawchuk, 2005), and its higher relevance to the study hypotheses. 
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 The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item self-
report measure of how individuals use the strategies of reappraisal and suppression to regulate 
and control their emotions. Respondents agree or disagree with each item on a Likert scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly disagree). The ERQ consists of two subscales, the 
Reappraisal subscale and the Suppression subscale, which form independent factors. The ERQ 
demonstrates adequate internal consistency. 
 The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale Short Form (IUS-12; Carleton, Norton, & 
Asmundson, 2007) is a 12-item self-report questionnaire that examines a person’s reactions to 
uncertainty. It consists of two subscales: a seven-item subscale that measures fear and anxiety 
toward future events (Prospective Anxiety; IUS-PA), and a five-item subscale that discusses 
inhibition of behavior due to uncertainty (Inhibitory Anxiety; IUS-IA). The IUS-12 demonstrates 
good convergent validity with the full version of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (Buhr & 
Dugas, 2002; Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). 
 The Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) is a 16-item self-
report test that examines an individual’s ability to visualize in their mind’s eye. The test consists 
of four descriptive scenes, each with a set of four particular details that participants are asked to 
visualize and then describe the clarity and vividness of their mental picture. The task is designed 
to be administered twice, first with eyes open and then with eyes closed. Due to time constraints, 
participants in this study were simply asked to visualize the descriptions once without instruction 
as to whether their eyes should be open or closed. The VVIQ is a task commonly used in 
neuroimaging experiments, but limited psychometric information is available.  
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2.3 Apparatus 
 Physiological data were collected via a BIOPAC MP150 hardware unit and 
AcqKnowledge version 4.1 software (BIOPAC Systems, Inc.). Skin conductance level (SCL) 
was recorded using a GSR100C amplifier, two TSD203 6 mm Ag/AgCl electrodes, and GEL101 
electrode paste, placed on the middle phalanges of the second and third fingers of the non-
dominant hand and held in place by Velcro straps (BIOPAC Systems, Goleta, CA). SCL data 
were sampled at a rate of 200 samples per second. 
2.4 Procedure 
 The experiment consisted of two sessions, conducted approximately forty-eight hours 
apart. Upon arrival to the lab at the first session, participants were given a brief overview of the 
experiment and signed a consent form agreeing to participate. Sensors were placed on the 
participant’s non-dominant hand to measure skin conductance throughout the experiment. The 
participant first answered a series of questionnaires on the computer (see Measures above). Next, 
they provided baseline ratings of two images from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) from each of three emotion categories: Fear, Disgust, 
and Sadness. The image sets were matched for mean valence, and the Fear and Disgust image 
sets were matched for mean arousal. For each image, participants rated the intensity of the 
specific emotion they experienced while viewing the image, as well as the overall distress they 
experienced while viewing the image, on a Likert scale from 0 (none) to 8 (most in my life). 
After image rating was complete, participants viewed a series of images from each of the three 
emotion categories described above. Participants saw images from all three categories in block 
randomized order. Images were displayed for 3.5 s, followed by 2.5 s of contextual information 
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(either a word or a fixation cross), and finally 6 s of a black screen. The context in which each 
image appeared was dependent on the group to which the participant was randomized. One 
group of participants saw words that related to the emotional content of each image (e.g., 
GROSS for an image in the Disgust category). A second group saw unrelated emotion words 
after each image (e.g., ANNOYED for an image in the FEAR category). A third group saw only 
a fixation cross after each image. Images repeated a total of six times in random order within a 
given block, and the same word appeared each time an image was repeated. Participants were 
given a short break in between each block. After viewing all the images, participants again rated 
the initial six images they saw at the beginning of the experiment for both specific emotional 
intensity and distress. 
 Forty-eight hours later, participants returned to the lab to complete the second session of 
the experiment. All participants underwent the same procedures at Session 2, regardless of 
group. After sensors were again placed on the participant’s non-dominant hand, the participant 
rated the initial six images viewed at Session 1 for emotional intensity and distress. After rating, 
image viewing began in block randomized format. Each emotion block consisted of the six 
images from Session 1 plus two novel images of similar valence and arousal. Images were 
displayed for 6 s, with 6 s of a black screen displayed in between images. No words were 
presented after the images at Session 2, in accordance with prior research (Tabibnia et al., 2008; 
Kircanski et al., 2012). Images repeated five times in random order within each emotion block. 
Finally, participants completed a final set of ratings of emotional intensity and distress for the 
original six rated images, and were then debriefed. 
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2.5 Data Analysis 
 Planned analyses are specified below, along with specific hypotheses. For repeated-
measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) where data did not meet the assumption of sphericity, 
Huynh-Feldt corrections were used, as all estimates of sphericity were greater than 0.75 (Girden, 
1992). 
2.5.1 Image Ratings 
 A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an 
effect of Condition (Exposure Only, Unrelated Labels, or Related Labels) or Emotion (Fear, 
Disgust, Sadness) on distress and emotional intensity ratings over time, from the initial baseline 
image rating, to the image rating at the end of Session 1, to the initial image rating at Session 2. 
The data were examined for two-way interactions between Condition X Time, Condition X 
Emotion, and Time X Emotion, and for a three-way interaction between Condition X Time X 
Emotion. For distress ratings, data did not meet the assumption for sphericity for Time, χ2 = 6.03, 
p < .05, or for Emotion, χ2 = 11.84, p < .01. For emotional intensity ratings, the data did not meet 
the assumption for sphericity for Time, χ2 = 7.46, p = .02, or for the Time X Emotion interaction, 
χ2 = 30.78, p < .001. 
 Hypothesis 1a: Participant distress and emotion intensity ratings will decrease from 
baseline to Session 2 across all three groups, suggesting emotional habituation to images. 
Hypothesis 1b: There will be a significant interaction of Condition X Time; participants in the 
related-labeling condition will see the greatest decrease in levels of distress and emotional 
intensity from baseline to Session 2. Hypothesis 1c: There will be a significant three-way 
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interaction of Condition X Time X Emotion; related-affect labeling will be more effective at 
decreasing the emotional intensity of fear and disgust than sadness. 
2.5.2 Skin Conductance 
 Skin conductance data were available for 87 of the 120 participants; equipment was 
unavailable for the first 21 participants, and 10 participants were affected by an equipment 
malfunction. Peak SCL for each image was calculated by finding the peak SCL during the 
window from 0.5 s after image onset to 4 s after image offset, for a total window of 9.5 s 
(Boucsein et al., 2012). Peak SCLs were averaged across image category (Fear, Disgust, 
Sadness) to produce mean peak SCL for each set of images. Each participant therefore had mean 
peak SCL values for Fear, Disgust, and Sadness images at Session 1, repeated Fear, Disgust, and 
Sadness images at Session 2, and novel Fear, Disgust, and Sadness images at Session 2, with the 
exception of two participants whose Sadness data were incomplete. SCL data were positively 
skewed; thus, a log transformation (log[SCL+1]) was conducted to reduce skewness (Venables 
& Christie, 1980).  
 A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was an 
effect of Condition (Exposure Only, Unrelated Labels, Related Labels) or Emotion (Fear, 
Disgust, Sadness) on mean peak SCL from Session 1 to Session 2. The data were examined for 
two-way interactions between Condition X Time, Condition X Emotion, and Time X Emotion, 
and for a three-way interaction between Condition X Time X Emotion. SCL data did not meet 
the assumption for sphericity for Emotion, χ2 = 6.63, p = .04. 
 Next, a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to determine if there was 
an effect of Condition (Exposure Only, Unrelated Labels, Related Labels) or Emotion (Fear, 
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Disgust, Sadness) on mean peak SCL for Novel vs. Repeated images during Session 2. The data 
were examined for two-way interactions between Condition X Novel/Repeated, Condition X 
Emotion, and Novel/Repeated X Emotion, and for a three-way interaction between Condition X 
Novel/Repeated X Emotion. 
 Hypotheses for SCL were the same as the hypotheses for image rating data, as at least 
some concordance was expected between self-reported and physiological measures (Lang et al., 
1993; Rachman, 1978). Hypothesis 2a: Participant mean peak SCL will decrease from Session 1 
to Session 2 across all three groups, suggesting physiological habituation to images. Hypothesis 
2b: There will be a significant interaction of Condition X Time; participants in the related-
labeling condition will see the greatest decrease in mean peak SCL from Session 1 to Session 2. 
Hypothesis 2c: There will be a significant three-way interaction of Condition X Time X 
Emotion; participants in the related-affect-labeling condition will experience larger decreases in 
mean peak SCL during fear and disgust images compared to sadness images. Hypothesis 3: For 
participants in the related labels condition, decreases in mean peak SCL will generalize to novel 
fear and disgust images, but not sadness images. 
2.5.3 Individual differences 
 Finally, individual difference factors were examined with multiple two-way ANOVAs 
examining the effects of Labeling Condition and emotion-regulation ability on participant 
distress, emotional intensity, and skin conductance. Emotion-regulation ability was measured by 
participant scores on the AES, the ERQ, and the AAQ. Hypothesis 4: Within the affect labeling 
conditions, change in levels of mean peak SCL will be greatest in those with weaker emotion-
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regulation skills, as affect labeling will represent a simplified skill that allows for the greatest 
improvement in those with a weak repertoire of emotion-regulation strategies. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
 Mean scores on each of the questionnaires are shown in Table 1. No group differences 
were found across any of these measures. Table 2 displays initial image ratings by group. No 
group differences were found for image distress or image emotional intensity by group.  
3.1 Image Ratings: Distress 
 A three-way repeated-measures (Condition X Emotion X Time) ANOVA found no 
significant main effect of Condition on distress ratings, F(2, 115) = 0.18, p = .84, ηp2 < .01. 
However, there was a significant main effect of Time on distress. Overall, distress ratings 
significantly decreased over time, F(1.97, 226.18) = 31.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .22. Distress ratings 
showed a marginally significant decrease from baseline to the end of Session 1, p = .08, and a 
significant decrease from the end of Session 1 to the beginning of Session 2, p < .001. A 
marginally significant effect for Emotion was also found, F(1.88, 216.23) = 3.00, p = .06, ηp2 = 
.03. Post hoc analyses were conducted to analyze this trend; Disgust images were more 
distressing than Sadness images, p = .01, but not significantly different from Fear images, p = 
.82. Although distress ratings for Fear images were not significantly different from distress 
ratings for Sadness images, p = .05, there was a trend for Fear images to be more distressing than 
Sadness images.  
 	 22 
There were no significant two-way interaction effects for distress ratings; Condition X 
Time, F(3.93, 226.18) = 2.02, p = .09, ηp2 = .03; Condition X Emotion, F(3.76, 216.23) = 1.21, p 
= .31, ηp2 = .02; Time X Emotion, F(4, 460) = 1.81, p = .13, ηp2 = .02. The three-way interaction 
between Condition X Time X Emotion was also not significant, F(8, 460) = 0.71, p = .69, ηp2 = 
.01. Changes in distress ratings over time by Condition and Emotion are displayed in Figure 1. 
3.2 Image Ratings: Emotional Intensity 
A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA found no significant main effect of Condition 
on emotion intensity ratings, F(2, 115) = 0.09, p = .92, ηp2 < .01. There were, however, 
significant main effects of Time and Emotion on emotion intensity ratings. Overall, emotion 
intensity ratings significantly decreased over time, F(1.94, 223.19) = 28.20, p < .001, ηp2 = .20. 
Emotion intensity ratings did not differ from baseline to the end of Session 1, p = .25, but did 
significantly decrease from the end of Session 1 to the beginning of Session 2, p < .001. Emotion 
intensity ratings differed significantly by Emotion, F(2, 230) = 19.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .15; 
pairwise comparisons revealed that, as described above, Disgust was significantly more 
emotionally intense than Fear and Sadness, both ps < .001, while Sadness was significantly more 
emotionally intense than Fear, p = .03. 
A marginally significant Time X Condition interaction was observed, F(3.88, 223.19) = 
2.37, p = .06, ηp2 = .04. Thus, differences in emotion intensity by Condition were analyzed at 
each of the three time points using a one-way ANOVA. However, no significant differences 
between conditions were found at any of the three time points, all ps > .59. A marginally 
significant Time X Emotion interaction was also observed, F(3.82, 439.49) = 2.28, p = .06, ηp2 = 
.02. Thus, differences in emotion intensity by Emotion were analyzed at each of the three time 
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points. At baseline, emotion intensity was significantly different by Emotion, F(1.92, 220.94) = 
19.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .14. Disgust was rated as significantly more intense than both Fear and 
Sadness, both ps < .001, while Sadness was also rated as more intense than Fear, p < .05. At the 
end of Session 1, emotion intensity was also significantly different by Emotion, F(2, 230) = 
13.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Again, Disgust was rated as significantly more intense than both Fear 
and Sadness, both ps < .001, but Fear was not significantly more intense than Sadness, p = .10. 
At Session 2, emotion intensity was also significantly different by Emotion, F(2, 230) = 12.33, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .10. Here, Disgust was again rated as significantly more intense than both Fear and 
Sadness, both ps < .01, and Sadness was rated as more intense than Fear, p = .02. 
The interaction of Emotion X Condition was not significant, F(4, 230) = 1.03, p = .39, ηp2 
= .02. Finally, the three-way interaction between Condition X Time X Emotion was not 
significant, F(7.64, 439.49) = 0.94, p = .48, ηp2 = .02. Changes in emotion intensity ratings over 
time by Condition and Emotion are displayed in Figure 2. 
3.3 Skin Conductance 
 There were no differences in baseline log SCL across the three conditions, F(2,84) =  
0.08, p = .92. Similarly, there were no differences in the mean peak SCL by condition for each of 
the three sets of emotion pictures, all Fs < 1.02, all ps > .36. There were also no significant 
correlations between change in mean peak SCL for Fear, Disgust, or Sadness pictures and any of 
the self-report measures. 
3.3.1 Change in Mean Peak SCL from Session 1 to Session 2 
A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA found no significant main effect of Condition, 
F(2,82) = 1.78, p = .18, ηp2 = .04; Emotion, F(1.93,158.24) = 0.05, p = .95, ηp2 < .01; or Time, 
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F(1,82) = 1.24, p = .27, ηp2 = .02 on mean peak SCL. However, a significant Time X Emotion 
interaction was found, F(2, 164) = 3.40, p = .04, ηp2 = .04. Paired-samples t-tests were used to 
examine differences in mean peak SCL from Session 1 to Session 2 for each Emotion. For Fear 
images, there was a statistical trend toward reduction in mean peak SCL, t(86) = 1.73, p = .09. 
For Disgust images, mean peak SCL significantly decreased from Session 1 to Session 2, t(86) = 
2.49, p = .02. There was no significant change in mean peak SCL level for Sadness images, t(84) 
= -1.02, p = .31. 
There were no significant two-way interaction effects for Condition X Time, F(2, 82) = 
1.15, p = .32, ηp2 = .03; or Condition X Emotion, F(3.86, 158.24) = 0.64, p = .63, ηp2 = .02. The 
three-way interaction between Condition X Time X Emotion was also not significant, F(4, 164) 
= 1.76, p = .14, ηp2 = .04. 
3.3.2 Generalization to Novel Images 
A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA found a trend toward a main effect of Condition 
on mean peak SCL during Session 2, F(2,82) = 2.57, p = .08, ηp2 = .06. This trend was followed 
up with post hoc pairwise comparisons. Participants in the unrelated labels group had 
significantly lower mean peak SCL during Session 2 than participants in the related labels group, 
p < .05, and marginally lower mean peak SCL during Session 2 than participants in the exposure 
only group, p = .06; participants in the exposure group and related labels group did not differ 
from one another. There were no differences in mean peak SCL between novel and repeated 
images, F(1,82) = 0.02, p = .90, ηp2 < .01. There was a trend toward a difference in mean peak 
SCL by Emotion, F(2,164) = 2.76, p = .07, ηp2 = .03. Post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed a 
significantly larger mean peak SCL for Sadness images compared to Disgust images, p = .02. 
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Fear images were not significantly different from Sadness images, p = .10, or Disgust images, p 
= .64. 
Although the two-way interaction effect for Novel/Repeated X Emotion on mean peak 
SCL was not significant, a trend was identified, F(2, 164) = 2.42, p = .09, ηp2 = .03. Paired-
samples t-tests were used to examine differences in mean peak SCL between Novel and 
Repeated images for each Emotion. There were no significant differences in mean peak SCL 
between Novel and Repeated images for any Emotion, ps > .08. A trend toward a difference 
between Novel and Repeated Fear images was noted, t(86) = 1.79, p = .08, with larger mean 
peak SCL in response to novel Fear images compared to repeated Fear images. There were no 
significant two-way interaction effects for Condition X Novel/Repeated, F(2, 82) = 0.09, p = .92, 
ηp2 < .01; or Condition X Emotion, F(4, 164) = 1.86, p = .12, ηp2 = .04 on mean peak SCL. The 
three-way interaction between Condition X Novel/Repeated X Emotion was also not significant, 
F(4, 164) = 1.38, p = .24, ηp2 = .03. 
3.4 Individual Differences in Emotion Regulation 
 The three-way repeated-measures ANOVA analysis conducted above was repeated, using 
scores on the AES, AAQ, ERQ Reappraisal, and ERQ Suppression as covariates in separate 
models, to determine the effect of individual differences in emotion regulation skills on the 
above findings. There were no significant interactions between AAQ scores or ERQ Reappraisal 
scores and Emotion, Time, or Condition variables. However, some trends were found with AES 
and ERQ Suppression scores. 
There was a marginally significant interaction for Time X AES score, F(1, 81) = 3.50, p 
= .07, ηp2 = .04, with participants with higher scores on the AES experiencing a greater decrease 
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in mean peak SCL over time. However, significant correlations between AES score and change 
in mean peak SCL were not found when examining images by emotion category. While there 
was no significant interaction between Emotion, Condition, and AES scores in the ANOVA 
analysis, correlational analyses revealed a significant positive correlation between change in 
mean peak SCL for Fear images and AES total score, r(28) = .49, p < .01, for participants in the 
unrelated-labels condition, with no significant correlations for participants in the other 
conditions. 
There was also a significant interaction between Condition and ERQ suppression scores, 
F(1, 81) = 4.83, p = .03, ηp2 = .06. For participants in the unrelated labels condition, change in 
mean peak SCL for Fear images was significantly negatively correlated with ERQ suppression 
score, r(28) = -.41, p < .05. No significant correlations were found for any other conditions, or 
for changes in mean peak SCL for Disgust and Sadness images. Additionally, there was a 
marginally significant Emotion X Time X ERQ Suppression interaction, F(2, 162) = 2.86, p = 
.06, ηp2 = .03. For the total sample, ERQ suppression score was negatively correlated with 
change in mean peak SCL for Fear images at a trend level, r(86) =  -.19, p = .09; there were no 
significant correlations between ERQ suppression score and change in mean peak SCL for 
Disgust or Sadness images. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The present study revealed that exposure to emotional images led to decreased ratings of 
image distress and emotional intensity over time, regardless of labeling context or the specific 
emotional content of the image. However, no differences in the magnitude of these changes were 
found when comparing labeling conditions to one another. For subjective ratings, it appears that 
the effects of affect labeling, whether related or unrelated to the emotional content of the image, 
do not differ from the effects of mere exposure. Although images were selected based on 
previous ratings that suggested they were equivalently negatively valenced, our participants rated 
disgusting images as the most distressing, followed by fearful images and then sadness images. 
Additionally, participants thought that disgust images were more intense than both fear and 
sadness images, while sadness images were more intense than fear images. One explanation for 
these divergent findings is that images selected to represent the Fear category were not intense 
enough to be labeled as “Fear;” participants seemed to be more distressed by these images than 
specifically afraid of them. 
When examining a measure of physiological arousal (skin conductance), differences 
between emotions emerged. Participants showed evidence of habituation to disgusting and fear-
inducing images, but not to sad images. There were no group differences in habituation, 
suggesting that labeling (related or unrelated) had no specific effect. However, when examining 
generalization to novel images, a trend emerged for participants in the unrelated-labeling 
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condition. These participants demonstrated increased generalized habituation to novel distressing 
images (of any emotion type) compared to their peers in the related-labeling and exposure only 
groups, meaning that they showed lower mean peak skin conductance levels during Session 2 
compared to other participants, regardless of whether the images were novel or repeated. 
Individual differences in emotion-regulation abilities appear to play a role in change in 
physiological arousal to distressing images, but not in the way predicted. Increased emotional 
intelligence predicted greater decreases in physiological arousal over time. Participants with a 
greater tendency toward emotional suppression experienced smaller decreases in physiological 
arousal to fear images (but not disgust or sadness images) over time, suggesting less habituation. 
These findings support the limited efficacy of suppression on changing one’s emotional 
experience (Gross, 2001, 2002). The only specific interactions between affect labeling and 
emotion skills were that participants in the unrelated-labeling group with higher emotional 
intelligence had greater habituation to fear images, and those who endorsed high emotional 
suppression had significantly less habituation to fear images. This result suggests that affect 
labeling may not additionally benefit those with poorer emotional intelligence, but may provide a 
marginal benefit for those who already have good emotion-regulation skills. Participants needed 
to find ways to connect the images presented with the meanings of unrelated words, a task that 
might take additional cognitive processing. Individuals with higher emotional intelligence may 
be the only ones who were able to do this successfully in the short period of time between 
images.  
Although there were no labeling-related differences with respect to specific emotion 
responses, the finding that participants habituated to fear and disgust images over time, but not 
sadness images, supports the general use of exposure for fear and disgust, but not sadness. 
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Increased exposure to the sad images may have promoted rumination, which is associated with 
depressive symptoms and may also have negative effects on normal experiences of sadness 
(Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
These results are in line with existing clinical knowledge and the psychopathology treatment 
literature. Additionally, they support the differentiation of negatively valenced stimuli in future 
research on exposure and emotion regulation. Because the action tendencies associated with 
these emotions are different (i.e., disgust and fear both involve a tendency to escape or avoid, 
while sadness involves a tendency to withdraw, reflect, and evoke sympathy from others; 
Bonanno et al., 2008; Frijda, 1987; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Izard, 1977, 1993; 
Lazarus, 1991), the interventions used to address problems with over-activations of these 
emotions might therefore differ as well (Beck & Haigh, 2014; Davey, 2011; Mason & 
Richardson, 2010). Basic research on emotion should continue to examine discrete negative 
emotions individually, instead of lumping together negative affect, due to the added information 
regarding cognitive, behavioral, and physiological changes that a discrete emotions model 
provides (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). 
Aspects of the present findings are in line with previous research on affect labeling. 
Results from Tabibnia and colleagues (2008) were partially replicated, in that participants in the 
unrelated-labeling condition had greater habituation to novel images. However, this result does 
not support the claim that affect labeling is an effective, easily learned emotion-regulation 
strategy. Affect labeling is defined as verbalizing one’s feelings (Lieberman et al., 2007). 
However, participants who saw distressing images with related emotion words did not 
experience significant improvements in habituation; only participants who saw emotion words 
that did not relate to the image they viewed had improved generalization. This is not affect 
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labeling. Participants in this condition would often report during debriefing that the word-image 
pairings made no sense (providing support for the validity of the unrelated-label condition), and 
several mentioned that they made up stories in order to remember the word-picture relationship. 
The finding that greater emotional intelligence and reduced use of suppression as an emotion-
regulation strategy was significantly correlated with habituation to fear images in the unrelated-
labeling condition further supports the idea that other emotion-regulation strategies may have a 
stronger effect on fear habituation compared to affect labeling, which did not correlate with 
emotion regulation skills. 
Because we did not design our study to examine other emotion-regulation strategies, it is 
hard to say exactly what emotion-regulation strategy participants were using in the unrelated-
labeling condition. Perhaps they were simply distracted by the incongruous content match and 
focused less on their emotional experience, or perhaps they were engaging in a deeper level of 
abstract processing. Tabibnia and colleagues (2008) state:  
“Unrelated words…may promote more elaborate processing of the pictures, such that 
participants may be thinking more deeply about each picture, in an attempt to find a 
relationship between it and the label. Such deeper processing may enhance exposure 
effects at follow-up (Rachman, 1980). That is, unrelated words may require an extra step 
or level of abstract processing that the related words do not.” 
This is one possible explanation of our replicated findings, but does not support the efficacy of 
affect labeling. Additionally, this explanation fits with the emotional processing theory of 
exposure therapy (Foa & Kozak, 1986), but not with the inhibitory learning model, which 
suggests affect labeling may enhance inhibitory regulation during exposure (Craske et al., 2008, 
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2014). This is not to say that emotion regulation is not an important component of exposure; 
indeed, these results suggest that it is. However, affect labeling is not the emotion regulation 
strategy on which to focus. In a non-clinical population, distraction may be an effective method 
of down-regulating emotional experience. Clinical populations may benefit more from learning 
cognitive reappraisal strategies, as was found in a sample of socially anxious patients who 
completed cognitive-behavioral therapy (Moscovitch et al., 2012).  
It is important to note that these results are at odds with the findings of Kircanski and 
colleagues (2012), in which affect labeling produced greater reductions in skin conductance to a 
fearful stimulus compared to reappraisal, distraction, and exposure alone. However, the study 
design is significantly different between these two studies, in that their participants were facing a 
live phobic object (a spider) and asked to create a sentence about the spider and speak it aloud. It 
is possible that affect labeling may be effective at reducing fear, but only within specific 
contexts: the individual must generate their own description and emotional label of the feared 
stimulus. This kind of labeling involves increased effort and cognitive processing on the part of 
the participant, whereas reading a single emotion word that may or may not accurately reflect a 
participant’s emotional experience does not. There may be therapeutic benefits to having 
exposure therapy clients label their emotions that do not generalize to the population at large. 
Because basic and applied research of affect labeling show conflicting results, additional 
research examining mechanisms is needed. Unrelated labeling appears to be effective in 
laboratory studies, but it is unclear if this technique can be used in clinical contexts, and its 
mechanism is unexplained. Future studies can examine unrelated-affect labeling using fMRI to 
provide a clearer picture of what happens in the brain during this kind of emotional processing, 
and may clarify what is going on at the neural level during the processing of images with 
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unrelated labels. Participants can also be asked to explicitly describe their thought process when 
viewing an unrelated label. 
These results do not lend support to the idea that affect labeling is effective across 
multiple emotional contexts. Evidence for the superiority of unrelated labels for fear images in 
those with higher emotional intelligence is the only result from this study that supports 
differentiation specific to labeling condition. Future research could examine affect labeling in 
other emotions, such as anger, embarrassment, or guilt, to determine if there is any effect of 
affect labeling in these conditions. However, based on the results of this study, research efforts 
may be best directed toward other methods of improving exposure, instead of searching for a use 
for affect labeling beyond fear. Emotion regulation may indeed be a key to improving clinical 
outcomes, but affect labeling does not appear to be the solution. Future research should target 
specific mechanisms of emotion regulation at the neural, physiological, cognitive, and affective 
levels to determine which emotion regulation skills will be most useful when incorporated into 
exposure therapy. 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Trait and State Measures by Condition 
 Exposure Only Unrelated Labels Related Labels Total   
 M (SD) 
n = 38 
M (SD) 
n = 40 
M (SD) 
n = 40 
M (SD) 
n = 118 
 
F 
 
p 
AAQ   32.4   (8.85)   33.7   (7.84)   34.9   (8.64)   33.7   (8.44)   .840 .434 
AES 126.8 (11.56) 125.2 (14.09) 126.0 (12.52) 126.0 (12.69)   .146 .865 
BAI   10.1   (9.62)     8.0   (6.92)     9.1   (9.19)     9.0   (8.61)   .629 .535 
CES-D   15.0 (10.44)   12.5   (9.26)   11.9   (9.08)   13.1   (9.61) 1.122 .329 
DPSSR-S   14.2   (4.22)   14.8   (4.88)   14.2   (4.56)   14.4   (4.54)   .254 .776 
ERQ_Suppression   13.6   (4.64)   14.4   (5.32)   13.9   (5.06)   13.9   (4.99)   .224 .799 
ERQ_Reappraisal   31.4   (5.79)      29.8   (5.24)   31.5   (6.00)   30.9   (5.69) 1.165 .316 
IUS*   26.5   (9.35)   27.9   (9.11)   26.4   (7.52)   26.9   (8.57)   .247 .782 
   IUS-PA*   15.3   (5.07)   16.6   (5.37)   15.3   (4.57)   15.7   (4.97)   .572 .567 
   IUS-IA*   11.2   (4.54)   11.3   (4.31)   11.1   (3.67)   11.2   (4.12)   .017 .984 
VVIQ      2.0  (0.54)      2.2  (0.57)      2.1  (0.51)     2.1   (0.54)   .629 .535 
Note: For IUS, IUS-PA, and IUS-IA, total n = 85, as this measure was added later. AAQ = Acceptance and 
Action Questionnaire; AES = Assessing Emotions Scale; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; CES = Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale; DPSSR-S = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised – 
Sensitivity; ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale Short Form; 
IUS-PA = Prospective Anxiety; IUS-IA = Inhibitory Anxiety; VVIQ = Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire. 
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Table 2 
Image Ratings for Fear, Disgust, and Sadness by Condition 
 Exposure Only Unrelated Labels Related Labels Total   
 M (SD) 
n = 38 
M (SD) 
n = 40 
M (SD) 
n = 40 
M (SD) 
n = 118 
 
F 
 
p 
Distress       
   Fear 3.55 (2.23) 3.65 (2.04) 3.01 (1.79) 3.40 (2.03)   .018 .982 
   Disgust 3.47 (2.13) 3.39 (1.87) 3.43 (2.04) 3.43 (2.00) 1.147 .321 
   Sadness 3.26 (2.00) 3.01 (1.80) 2.81 (2.00) 3.03 (1.93)   .531 .590 
Emotional Intensity        
   Fear 3.76 (2.10) 3.35 (1.82) 3.08 (2.00) 3.39 (1.98)    .072 .931 
   Disgust 4.49 (1.93) 4.33 (1.78) 4.39 (1.98) 4.40 (1.88) 1.199 .305 
   Sadness 3.93 (1.89) 3.48 (1.74) 3.80 (2.05) 3.73 (1.89)   .608 .546 
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Figure 1 
(a)  
(b)  
(c)  
Changes in distress ratings for (a) Fear, (b) Disgust, and (c) Sadness by Condition. Note: Error 
bars represent one standard error.  
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Figure 2 
 
(a)  
 
(b)  
 
(c)  
 
Changes in emotion intensity ratings for (a) Fear, (b) Disgust, and (c) Sadness by Condition. 
Note: Error bars represent one standard error.  
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Figure 3 
 
(a)   
 
(b)   
 
(c)   
 
Mean peak SCL for novel and repeated (a) Fear, (b) Disgust, and (c) Sadness images by 
Condition. Note: Error bars represent one standard error. 
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